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Competition Policy: One Theory,
Three Systems
Neither China nor Hong Kong are likely to adopt workable competition
laws in the near future. The Taiwan experience is positive
Mark Williams
1 There are few subjects  more important to governments than economic growth and
development; the key question is how best to achieve them. The governments of China,
Hong Kong and Taiwan are no different to other jurisdictions is this respect. All three
entities now subscribe, to a greater or lesser extent, to market-orientated solutions to
economic problems. But few governments are prepared to tolerate a complete laissez
faire economy. All  governments seek to regulate their economies to some extent or
other.  Socialist  economics  requires  complete  state  domination  of  all  the  factors  of
production, whereas the majority of countries that subscribe to a capitalist model seek
to ensure that the mechanism that delivers the optimal operation of markets, namely
competition between rival businesses, is fostered and maintained. 
2 Competition policy comprises a political commitment to markets, public education and
advocacy  campaigns,  and  the  allocation  of  sufficient  resources  (both  human  and
financial) to endow an enforcement body and administrative instruments to promote
competition. These are the elements needed to achieve a competition culture. However,
a  competition  policy  cannot  be  effective  without  a  legislative  instrument  that
articulates  the  policy  in  normative  terms,  gives  power  to  an  enforcement  body  to
investigate complaints, and an adjudicative mechanism to resolve disputed decisions
and provide  suitable  penalties  for  those  who break the  law.  The legislative  tool  to
achieve the fulfilment of this policy choice is competition or anti-trust law 1.
3 This article seeks to examine the present position of competition policy and law in
mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. It is not possible to microscopically examine
this very large topic here 2. However, a general survey, with illustrations of the most
important  facets  of  each  system,  will  be  attempted.  The  differing  approaches  to
competition regulation resulting  from the  political  and economic  systems found in
each jurisdiction will be analysed.
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What is competition and competition law?
4 Competition is an economic concept that postulates that economic resources will be
most efficiently deployed when any given product market is contested by rivals. The
larger the number of competitors, the more efficient resource allocation will be. The
efficiency of individual firms will also be enhanced by a threat of a loss of business to
competitors. Society benefits as firms will bring new products to the market place in
hope that their innovation will  be rewarded with a larger market share and higher
profits. Consumers also gain from the availability of choice. Thus, classical economics
suggests that the closer an economy is to a state of perfect competition 3,  the more
likely is the optimal outcome of lower prices and greater choice.
5 While this microeconomic theory is laudable, the rational business owner will seek to
avoid competition wherever possible as competition for an individual business is risky.
If an individual firm is successful it will achieve a large market share and high profits,
but if it is unsuccessful then bankruptcy looms. In order to play safe, a rational business
will  seek to reduce risk by combining with its  rivals to suppress price and product
competition by cartel arrangements to fix prices and/or to allocate markets.
6 Another strategy to promote stability and profitability is merger with rival firms to
form a larger unit to concentrate the market power of the firm which might ultimately
lead to a complete monopoly. Lastly, a business might, by organic growth, as a result of
a superior product or business skill, obtain a position of dominance through its own
merit;  Microsoft  might  be  an example  of  this  phenomenon.  But  this  might  lead to
abuses by the dominant firm in order to inhibit the development of rivals or destroy
them by the use  of  market  power before  they can challenge the incumbent  in  the
market  where  it  is  dominant,  or  in  an  adjacent  market  where  it  seeks  to  expand;
Microsoft was condemned by the US Federal Court 4 for exactly these practices, when it
sought to use its market power to prevent Oracle browser software having equal access
to  the  initial screen  that  PC  manufacturers  pre-loaded  as  part  of  a  package  sale.
Microsoft was not dominant in the browser market, but was dominant in the operating
system market. Microsoft used its market power in one market to influence behaviour
in the adjacent browser market. Microsoft sought to threaten manufacturers with a
refusal to supply its Windows product if manufacturers also installed Oracle browser
software  and  gave  equivalent  access  to  the  Oracle  product  that  was  enjoyed  by
Microsoft’s browser product.
7 Whatever the theoretical position that eulogises perfect competition, the reality is that
such atomistic markets rarely, if ever, exist in our imperfect world. Consequently, if
perfect competition is unobtainable, what then, should be the goal of a government
seeking to maximise the benefit to be obtained from capitalism? The answer appears to
be seeking to achieve a position where markets  are contestable,  that  is,  seeking to
ensure that firms can enter or leave any given market, so that they have the possibility
of competing with incumbent market operators. The primary goal of most countries’
competition policy is to preserve the mechanism of competition, rather than to protect
individual  competitors,  although  competitors  or  consumers  may  benefit  from
enforcement of a pro-competition policy that maintains the competitive mechanism.
This is because individuals injured by anti-competitive practices or abusive conduct by
dominant firms, may receive protection or even financial compensation as a result of
the protective provisions of a competition law. 
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8 However, no competition policy is entirely based on the maintenance of competition at
any  price.  All  systems  allow  overriding  public  interest  reasons  to  trump  purist
competition policies  and to  condone the  establishment  of  monopolies  or  cartels  or
collusive arrangements that might threaten or prevent competition. Such exceptions to
the general law can include the development of new products through joint venturing,
efficient utilisation of public assets, or the reward of innovatory behaviour by the grant
of patent or copyright exclusivity for a fixed term.
9 It should be noted, however, that agreement on the aims of competition policy and law
are  by  no  means  uniform—different  countries  pursue  strikingly  different  political,
economic and social objectives under the guise of competition law—and this may even
be perverted to perform a protectionist  function for  domestic  industries  under the
mantle of enforcing “fair” competition rules, as can also be the case with other trade
remedies such as anti-dumping duties. The divergence of competition policy objectives
is  now less  apparent  in  the  two most  important  competition  law jurisdictions,  the
United States and the European Union, than was previously the case; most observers
now agree with Posner that the primary objective of competition policy is to promote
economic welfare 5.
10 Having explained the nature and function of competition policy it is now necessary to
consider the individual responses of the governments of the three jurisdictions under
consideration here, namely, mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
China 
11 For  the  last  twnty-five  years  China  has  been  moving  from  a  socialist  economic
paradigm to a capitalist one. The euphemism used by the Communist Party of China
(CCP) is that China is seeking to create a socialist-market economy 6. Such a creation
defies definition and none is given in the constitution of the PRC. However, in moving
the state away from a command and control philosophy towards a settlement where
market forces tend to predominate in economic decision-making, the CCP has refused
to countenance a concomitant political reform process. This stance may well mean that
an effective pro-competitive policy is impossible, as well be suggested later. China has
been working on a new comprehensive competition law for almost ten years to act as
the means by which the socialist-market will be policed to promote competition. The
desire  to  create  a  quasi-market  but  at  the  some  time  seeking  to  retain  control  of
strategic or sensitive economic sectors, such as basic industries, banking and media,
ineluctably means that the state will continue to have a major or even a predominant
role in economic decision making. If so, this appears to be a fundamental impediment
to the effective operation of a market system policed by a standard-model competition
law regime.  Added  to  this  basic  political-economy problem,  the  special  features  of
China’s economic, political and administrative machinery make the successful adoption
of  competition  law  as  the  enforcement  instrument  of  a  pro-competition  policy
questionable. 
The economic legacy
12 China’s transformation into a leading trading nation in just over twenty years, now
ranked sixth trading nation in the world, is a major achievement 7. The huge surge in
exported goods, in many ways masks the weaknesses of the domestic economy. Most
export-orientated business is owned and operated by non-mainland interests such as
private  Hong  Kong/Taiwan/Singapore  compatriots8 or  by  non-Chinese  foreign
investors.  Until  recently  this  group  of  producers  was  either  totally  prohibited  or
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allowed  only  limited  access  to  domestic  Chinese  markets,  so  while  the  export
processing and export-orientated sectors of the economy boomed as a result of cheap
labour and land costs, the domestic market was largely the preserve of the state-owned
enterprises (SOE) and to a smaller extent private domestic businesses, protected from
the  thrust  of  international  competition  by  tariffs,  quotas  or  other  administrative
measures.
13 Since WTO accession, all this has changed. Quotas will be abolished, tariffs substantially
reduced, and the foreign-owned export industries will be able to sell on the domestic
market without restriction. Thus, the previously protected domestic sector will  face
increasingly serious challenges over the next few years. The Maoist legacy of industrial
duplication of many factory facilities (for example, there are over one hundred vehicle
manufacturing plants in China most of which have a capacity of less than 50,000 units,
and other industrial sectors have the same problem) creates huge overcapacity and
waste  9.  This  policy  adopted  for  strategic/military  reasons,  coupled  with  a  state
guarantee of  full  employment means that  the SOE sector that  still  employs a  large
percentage of urban residents, is likely to suffer from the onslaught of new foreign
competition.
14 The economic stress of failing SOEs may also imperil  China’s banking system which
again  is  dominated  by  the  state.  The  effect  of  policy  landing  without  regard  to
commercial indicators of risk has created a vast and dangerous load of bad debt that
could  bring  down  the  whole  financial  system  in  China  10.  Reducing  the  bad  debt
problem  is  not  only  complex  but  also  hugely  expensive  as  it  would  require  the
recapitalisation of the whole system. This has now been attempted twice since 1998 and
a further effort is apparently now underway 11. The government has established “asset
management”  bodies  to  relieve  the  banks  of  this  burden  but,  the  amount  of  debt
transferred is only a small percentage of that owed by the SOE sector. Unthinkable as it
may be, insolvency of a major state bank is a real possibility which would have grave
consequences for not only financial and economic stability but also could threaten the
political  structure too.  Thus,  the introduction of  competition may be a  very mixed
blessing  for  the  domestic  Chinese  economy.  The  medicine  of  competition  to  force
improvements in domestic productivity may yet kill the patient.
Political issues
15 The Leninist structure and ideology of the CCP has been largely untouched by twenty-
five years of increasing economic liberalisation. The CCP can tolerate no challenge to
its political hegemony. But with this monolithic structure has come severe strain as a
result of rampant corruption at all levels of government 12. This cancer results from a
political settlement to ensure internal Party peace; by de facto allowing considerable
latitude to provincial and other subordinate levels of government to pursue their own
local economic policies that can and often do conflict with central government policy,
corruption on an heroic scale has been fostered.
16 A further pernicious result of this decentralisation of policy is that it has retarded the
creation of a unified single market in China. This is the result of two phenomena, the
existence of local protectionism and administrative monopoly.
17 Local  protectionism  takes  many  forms—differential  taxation  of  non-local  products,
physical  barriers  at  local  borders,  arbitrary  inspection  or  safety  certification
procedures—all designed to protect local production from “outside” competition.
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18 The  motivation  behind  such  measures  is  often  that  the  local  government  owns  or
controls the local producer, or receives tax revenue from them which would be lost if
“foreign” goods displaced the local product.
19 Administrative  monopoly  (AM)  relates  to  the  use  of  administrative  powers  to
monopolise economic sectors or to prevent competition with a favoured producer or
supplier. Both these phenomena can be seen at national as well as local level, when
government departments seek to protect their turf from new entrants to their markets
13. Examples include telecommunications, railways and energy supply.
20 In some respects both these phenomena are familiar to students of the drive to create a
single market within the European Union 14. The difference is that China is, in theory, a
single economy.
Legal system issues
21 China’s legal system is generally considered to be immature and underdeveloped 15.
22 The professionalism of legislative drafting, the promotion of legislative initiatives by
government,  enactment  by  the  National  People’s  Congress  (NPC)  or  its  Standing
Committee (NPCSC), and implementation by government departments, all need radical
improvement. Personnel in all parts of the government legislative process are in need
of improved skills, and the qualities of lawyers and judges may well not be adequate to
deal  with the highly  technical  and complex interdisciplinary issues  that arise  from
competition law. China’s capacity to create and enforce competition law is doubtful.
23 The active enforcement of any new competition statute would depend on a suitably
powerful executive body staffed with competent and expert personnel. Even if suitable
candidates could be found, the political and administrative structures in China are all
too  likely  to  prove  intractable  when  it  comes  to  the  enforcement  of  competition
decisions that threaten entrenched sectoral lobbies or equally powerful local interests
that have monopoly positions in relevant markets.
Current legislation
24 The 1993 Anti-Unfair Competition Law is not a true competition statute as the majority
of its provisions deal with consumer protection measures against counterfeit goods or
trade-consumer fraud 16.  The law is not a complete competition code. It addresses a
miscellany of issues including passing off (Art 5),  business bribery (Art 8),  false and
disparaging advertising (Art  9),  protection of  confidential  business  information and
trade secrets (Art 10), and false prize sales (Art 13). However, it does have something to
say about pure competition issues. Monopolists are forbidden to use predatory pricing
policies to destroy embryonic competitors (Art 6), other businesses are also forbidden
to  engage  in  similar  tactics  (Art  11),  and  forced  tie-in  sales  of  unrelated  goods  is
prohibited (Art 12) as are bid-rigging (Art 15), and AM conduct (Art 7). Government
organs  are  enjoined  against  restricting  freedom  of  choice  of  product  suppliers,
restricting arbitrarily the business freedom of operators and abusing administrative
powers  to  prevent  or  restrict  the  marketing  of  non-local  products  within  their
administrative area. Consequently, it can be seen that one of the most pressing issues
for China, the AM problem, was already identified as a significant issue in 1980 when
State  Council  regulations  addressed the same matter.  However,  in  China there  is  a
world of difference between the expression of legislative will and execution in practice
17.  The  recurrent  and  intractable  nature  of  AM  is  emphasised  yet  again  by  the
promulgation on April  21st 2001 of another administrative circular 18 outlawing AM
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practices;  presumably  it  has  been  enacted  because  the  previous  measures  were
ineffective. The new regulations largely set out which organ can overrule the decisions
of other manifestations of the state but do little to provide a remedy to those who
suffer  from administrative  abuse  as  a  result  of  illegal  conduct.  If  the  provisions  of
Article 7 of the 1993 Law had been effectively enforced, the issues alluded to in the 2001
regulations would not be of importance today. However, they remain a nested problem
of  major  significance  because,  while  the  national  legislative  will  is  apparent,  the
mechanisms of  enforcement provided by the statute are weak and are incapable of
overcoming the realities of local political power.
25 Enforcement  of  the  1993  Law  is  provided  for  in  articles  16  to  19.  Powers  of
investigation,  the  requirement  for  the  subjects  of  investigations  to  co-operate  and
provide information and records as required by the inspectors are included. Penalties
are set out in articles 20 to 29 and include both fines and injunctive powers to prevent
the  re-occurrence  of  prohibited  conduct.  Article  30  provides  for  higher  levels  of
government  to  supervise  lower  levels,  for  example,  for  provincial  governments  to
supervise municipal authorities. 
26 The  default  enforcement  authority  is  the  State  Administration  of  Industry  and
Commerce (SAIC), a national organisation answerable vertically to the State Council,
the  permanent  executive  arm  of  the  Chinese  government.  However,  this  body  is
functionally organised at each lower level of government and is funded and partially
responsible  to  that  corresponding level  of  government.  Therefore,  if  the  municipal
government of city X is imposing a blockade or a discriminatory licensing or taxation
regime against “foreign”, that is non-local Chinese goods, it is the municipal branch of
the SAIC that is responsible, in the first instance, to investigate its sponsoring local
authority.  Needless  to  say,  few  investigations  are  pursued  with  vigour,  when  the
subjects of their potential investigations control the pay, promotion and privileges of
the local SAIC staff 19. As regards anti-competitive acts by business, the enforcement is
also  weak  for  similar  reasons:  the  protection  afforded  by  local  political  interests
normally trumps the ability of the SAIC to act. It can also be seen that this statute is
incapable  of  dealing  with  many  commonly  found  competition  related  problems—
abusive  conduct  by  monopolists,  cartel  operations,  oligopoly  situations,  vertical
restraints or mergers, as these phenomena are not regulated by the provisions of the
Law.
27 Other statutes also have pro-competition provisions. The Law on Pricing (1997)20 has
some provisions aimed at competition issues. For example, Article 14 provides:
“Operators may not carry out any of the following unfair pricing acts: 
collude  with others  in  manipulating market  prices,  thereby harming the  lawful
rights and interests of other operators or consumers
(2) dump  merchandise  below  cost  in  order  to  force  out  competitors  or  to
monopolise the market,  thereby disturbing the normal order of  production and
business  and  harming  the  interests  of  the  state  or  the  lawful  rights  of  other
operators  except  for  the  disposal  of  fresh  produce,  seasonal  or  over  stocked
merchandise”
28 The terms manipulation, the test of harm, below cost, intent, monopolise, and normal order of
production are not defined. No suggestion of dominance as a requirement in (2) is made.
The provisions are clearly unworkable and do not appear to comprehend basic micro-
economic concepts.  Penalties are provided in articles 40 and 41 provides a right of
action to consumers who have suffered loss as a result of price-fixing conduct.
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29 The enforcement mechanism, especially in relation to administrative monopoly abuses
are weak, given that the SAIC local enforcement officials are paid by local, not central,
government, and many complaints relate to government or quasi-government abuses.
Chinese writers concur in this judgement 21.
Proposed legislation
30 China has been working on a new comprehensive competition law since 1994.  First
information was gathered about mainland economic structures. Then details of foreign
competition law systems were studied, evaluated and reported upon to a co-ordination
committee. By 1999, a first complete draft law was prepared for a conference which
included overseas experts and facilitated by the OECD. The 1999 draft follows the EU
model of a central administrative enforcement agency with comprehensive powers to
penalise abuses of dominant position, agreement between market operators, merger
control  provisions as  well  as  a  unique set  of  rules  on the abuses  of  administrative
powers by government.
31 By 2001, a further draft emerged which made various modifications but nothing is yet
finalised and further amendments can be expected before the ultimate draft of the law
emerges, so speculation at this stage as to the detail of the future statute is futile. The
only certainty, at this stage, is that political lobbying by special interest groups for
exemption or special treatment will change the final form of the legislation to some
extent or other.
32 The wholesale change of the top leadership of the CCP and government in 2003 saw the
reorganisation of the economic departments of state as a result of which the Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC) was expanded to administer
internal as well  as foreign trade. The now Ministry of Commerce (MOC) will  be the
driving force in finalising a comprehensive law and the new Minister of Commerce has
given a public commitment to early enactment 22.
33 However, problems may still arise, as has been demonstrated by the promulgation of a
standalone set of merger and acquisition rules in final form in March 2003 23.  These
regulations have very odd provisions governing jurisdiction to approve mergers and
which apply only to foreign entitles seeking to acquire Chinese businesses. Chinese-
Chinese  mergers  are  exempt.  It  might  be  arguable  that  these  discriminatory  rules
breach China’s commitment to most-favoured nation treatment and national treatment
as enshrined in the WTO accession agreement 24. 
34 This new development seems to suggest that any new competition statute may not be
used even-handedly to promote economic efficiency, but rather as a weapon to restrict
the growth of foreign businesses in the Chinese market by the acquisition of Chinese-
owned rivals.  Nationalistic,  rather  than economic,  ends are  thus served and so  the
commitment  of  the  Chinese  government  to  market-based  solutions  to  economic
problems may be brought into question.
Hong Kong
35 Colonial  Hong  Kong  was  traditionally  seen  as  a  bastion  of  free  market  capitalism
uninhibited by intrusive government controls, publicly-owned enterprises or import
controls  or  tariffs.  The  post-1997  Special  Administrative  Region  (SAR)  Tung
government has been anxious to burnish this image.
36 Hong Kong’s perceived minimal state intervention in economic matters is often hailed
as  creating  the  freest  25 economy  in  the  world.  The  HKSAR  government  uses  this
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perception of the Hong Kong economic environment to make a logical jump from a
“free” economy to a competitive one. In the government’s view, as Hong Kong is a free
economy, it must also be a competitive one. Further, this analysis is used to justify the
government’s policy that a comprehensive competition law is not only unnecessary but
would be harmful in stifling the business freedom that has served Hong Kong so well in
the past. The government sees no generalised competition problems in Hong Kong and
this reinforces its policy stance of substantive non-intervention, or, in extremis a limited
sector-specific approach. Enactment of a comprehensive competition law is rejected
outright.
Propaganda and reality—Is economic “freedom” synonymous with economic
competitiveness? 
37 The  government  conflates  two  quite  distinct  economic  sectors  in  Hong  Kong―the
domestic market sector and the export-oriented sector. The external sector is subject
to competition from producers worldwide who actively compete in the international
markets that Hong Kong exporters seek to sell to. These include textiles and clothing,
electrical  and  electronic  goods,  toys  and  footwear.  Hong  Kong  manufacturers  gain
orders worldwide, process them at Hong Kong headquarters,  manufacture in China,
and then export through mainland ports or Hong Kong. Few, if any, of these products
are destined for the Hong Kong market. The external market segment is undoubtedly
competitive.
38 However, the second part of the Hong Kong economy is the domestic market for goods
and services. This market is not nearly as competitive as the external sector. In fact,
many  parts  of  the  market  are  dominated  by  private  monopolists—electricity,  gas;
duopolies—ports,  supermarkets;  oligopolies—petroleum;  cartels—stock-broking,  bank
interest rates, professional services, travel agents, school textbook publishing 26.
39 Evidence of the ubiquity of these anti-competitive practices have been documented by
the Hong Kong Consumer Council 27 and many other observes and commentators 28.
Notwithstanding  this  mountain  of  actual  and  anecdotal  evidence,  the  Hong  Kong
government  suffers  from  wilful  blindness  in  refusing  to  acknowledge  these
deficiencies, ostensibly to buttress its “free market” philosophy but in reality because
the Hong Kong government is dominated by businessmen who directly or indirectly
have  vested  interests  in  these  uncompetitive  markets.  As  an  example,  the  Chief
Executive Tung Chee-hwa, was the CEO of the family shipping company OCCL when the
company was convicted of illegally participating in a land transport cartel by the EU
authorities 29. 
40 The legislature is effectively controlled by pro-government and pro-business interests
that have no political incentive to injure the powerful business interests of Hong Kong,
and  attempts  to  debate  a  general  competition  law  have  been  defeated  by  pro-
government/pro-business elements in the Legislative Council 30. In any event the pro-
business faction have an effective veto of legislation as a result of the peculiar voting
mechanism  in  the  legislative  that  requires  the  effective  consent  of  the  functional
constituencies that directly represent business interests 31.  This exercise of political
power is the real reason why the Hong Kong government refuses to see a problem and
to legislate for a comprehensive competition law.
41 Unsurprisingly,  the  government  pays  lip-service  to  a  pro-competition  stance  in  its
policy  pronouncements  and through the fig-leaf  of  its  Competition Advisory Group
(COMPAG)  32.  This  body  is  legally  powerless  to  investigate  alleged  anti-competitive
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market structures or practices by business: it also has no power to penalise and so is
entirely impotent as a protector of the competitive mechanism in the private sector.
42 Oddly,  given  the  open  hostility  of  government  to  a  general  competition  law,  full
regulation of abuse of dominant, restrictive agreements, and control of mergers does
exist in two industries—telecoms and broadcasting 33. Why these two industries have
been singled out for special treatment is something of a mystery but it  is  probably
because the government wanted to encourage new entrants into the market to make
Hong Kong a telecommunications and broadcasting hub to ensure that Singapore did
not dominate these emerging technology-orientated sectors in the future. The official
explanation is that Hong Kong adopts a sector specific policy and that full competition
provisions  are  appropriate  for  telecoms  and  broadcasting.  But  no  reason  for  this
assertion  is  provided;  beyond a  repetition  of  the  mantra  of  the  government’s  pro-
competition  policy  pronouncements  and  that  the  policy  is  sector  specific.  This
obviously is an entirely unconvincing explanation and adds nothing to the debate, so
laying bare  the  intellectual  paucity  of  the  government’s  reasoning and typifies  the
government’s shallow and illogical policy-creation process.
43 If this were not bad enough, most competition policy experts worldwide accept that
sector specific regulation should be minimised as it creates anomalies and distortions
caused  by  the  different  regulatory  requirements,  potential  industry  capture  of  the
regulator who ends up promoting industry interests and not those of the community at
large and because competition may be only one of the issues a regulator needs to be
concerned with. As a minimum, sector specific regulation needs to be integrated with
an  overarching  commitment  to  the  goal  of  increasing  competition  between  the
incumbent operator(s) and new entrants, wherever possible. This has been one of the
primary goals of recent changes in alignment of regulatory and competition policy and
law in the UK 34.
44 In Hong Kong individual  sectors continue to be regulated by contradictory regimes
with no overall commitment to competition as a primary goal. The result is regulatory
overlap and inconsistent goals with little thought of an integrated approach or any
clear commitment to competition.
45 Hong Kong competition policy stance has been criticised by the EU parliament 35, the
WTO  36,  the  Hong  Kong  American  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  the  United  States
Consulate  General  37,  the  Economist 38,  and  domestic  commentators39,  but  the
government refuses to shift its policy position, showing a complete unwillingness to
listen to public opinion from within Hong Kong or from external commentators. This
method of policy formation is exactly what led to the huge demonstration on July 1st
2003 against the proposed new national security laws. The government’s myopic and
short-sighted  policy  may  well  have  intensified  Hong  Kong’s  six  years  of  economic
malaise  since  1997.  By  supporting  rent-seeking,  inefficient  and  over-protected
domestic  monopolists  and  cartel  operators,  the  government  may  have  made  Hong
Kong’s economy more rigid and resistant to change. This policy is likely to result in
ossified, outdated economic structures and practices. Persisting in its refusal to enact a
general  competition  law  may  restrict  Hong  Kong’s  ability  to  react  speedily  and
efficiently to the undoubted economic challenges that lie ahead. 
46 Whether the government will practice a volte-face on a general competition law remains
to be seen. The government is quite capable of unpredictable changes in policy, without
warning, as was the case over the secret abandonment of a pledge to build 80,000 new
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flats in 1998,  the decision in June 2003 to enact comprehensive race discrimination
legislation40 (which the government had resisted for years on the basis that there was
no serious race discrimination problem), and by the abrupt withdrawal of the national
security  legislation  in  August  2003.  Thus,  it  is  possible,  though  unlikely,  that  the
government  might  shift  its  position suddenly  and without  warning on competition
legislation. 
Taiwan
47 Competition policy in Taiwan has quite a different history to that in the PRC or Hong
Kong. Following the retreat of the Kuomintang (KMT) to Taiwan in 1949 the economy
developed for the next thirty-five years largely under the guidance of the Party-state.
Direct state ownership of industry was minimal but the KMT had strategic interest in
many industrial sectors. Thus political intervention in the economy was much greater
than in Hong Kong but clearly less than the mainland. 
48 A  manufacturing  base  developed  whereby  large-scale  industries  were  fostered  and
protected by the Party-state,  and which was mainly domestic  in character.  Smaller
scale  manufacturing  and  technology-based  businesses  were  mainly  in  the  hands  of
family-controlled businesses which relied on export markets.
49 Thus, most large-scale domestic businesses were in the hands of a smaller number of
large firms part owned and financed by the KMT and protected by government, while
family firms concentrated on the export market. Domestic industry of both types was
protected by external tariffs from foreign competition. Taiwan’s economic success was
substantially facilitated by economic and military assistance from the United States
that granted crucial preferential access to the American market for Taiwanese goods in
the Cold War era 41. To understand the development of competition policy in Taiwan it
is necessary to outline both the political and economic background.
Taiwan politics
50 In 1949, as a result of losing the civil war in China, the nationalist KMT government
decamped  to  Taiwan.  Recognised,  promoted  and  sponsored  as  the  legitimate
government of the whole of China, principally by the United States, Taiwan endured
forty  years  of  statist,  authoritarian  government.  Slowly  however,  the  politics  of
dictatorship were superseded by the politics of democracy. Upon the death of President
Chiang  Kai-shek  in  1975,  Yen  Chia-kan  took  the  reigns  of  power  and  was  in  turn
replaced  by  Chiang’s  son  Chiang  Ching-kuo  in  1978.  He  began  moves  towards
democratisation in 1987 by lifting the state of martial law which had persisted since
1949. 
51 Amendment of various repressive laws, the repeal of the Temporary Provisions of 1948
which  had  suspended  the  constitution  and  the  ending  of  the  “Period  of  National
Mobilisation for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” in May 1990, all moved
Taiwan away from the authoritarian stance of the KMT. The successor KMT president
Lee Teng-hui permitted the establishment of civil society. Elections for the legislature
were held in 1991 and 1992, and in 1996 the President of the Republic was elected by
direct universal suffrage. In 2000, the leader of the opposition party, Chen Shui-bian
became the first head of state in Chinese history to obtain office through a peaceful
transition of political power. As a result of the 2000 election, the Taiwanese political
system came of age; it marked “the ‘consolidation’ of the country’s democracy, defined
by most scholars as a transfer of political power to an opposition party” 42. 
Taiwan economy
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52 During the authoritarian phase of government, the KMT transformed Taiwan from an
agricultural economy to an industrial one. GNP per capita rose from US$196 in 1952 to
US$3,993 in 1986 and in overall terms grew from US$1.674 billion to US$77.296 billion
over  the  same  period43.  By  the  mid  1960s  Taiwan  had  become  a  predominantly
industrial  products  exporter  and  the  contribution  of  private  enterprises  gradually
overtook the previous predominance of state-owned firms. For example, in 1952 state
enterprises  contributed  57%  of  industrial  production  but  in  1980  less  than  20%.
However,  many  strategic  enterprises  were  monopolised  by  the  state―petroleum,
electricity,  gas,  water,  steel,  railways,  shipbuilding,  posts  and  telecommunications,
tobacco, alcoholic spirits and banking. Further, the KMT had significant influence over
and ownership of many strategic business sectors in Taiwan. 
53 The  Party  owned  or  controlled  over  fifty  enterprises  via  two  very  influential
investment houses and so had the ability to directly intervene in a number of economic
sectors. The private sector was divided into essentially two groups—the one hundred
large-scale  business  conglomerates  composed  of  some  seven  to  eight  hundred
component firms accounting for 34% of GNP in 1988 but employing only 4.6% of the
workforce and were concentrated in the high technology industry and the domestic
economy.  However,  there  were  also  a  large  number  of  small  and  medium-  sized
enterprises (SMEs), in 1961 there were 178,916 of them and in 1986 there were around
750,000. They had several distinguishing characteristics. They were predominantly in
the  commercial  sector,  concentrating  on export  markets,  most  have  less  than fifty
employees, they utilise private capital,  are family operated and were less supported
and protected by government than the large-scale businesses 44. 
54 The political-economy adopted by the KMT envisaged public control over certain key
sectors of the economy but allowed ample room for the development of the private
market economy. In some ways it  mirrored the German Ordoliberal ideology 45,  but
with an emphasis on primary economic development and a greater role for the state in
certain  strategic  industries  and  also  a  stronger  co-ordinating  role,  whereby
competition was not necessarily seen as beneficial. Hsiao and Cheng 46 have categorised
Taiwan’s  economic development into  four  phases  (1)  the  import  substitution phase
(1949-59) during which the embryonic industrial sector developed to out-grow both
agriculture and textiles, (2) the export-orientated industrialisation phase (1960s) which
was  stimulated  by  a  policy  of  devaluation,  liberalising  the  foreign  trade  regime,
allowing FDI to promote export processing in special  zones and eliminating certain
import restrictions. In some ways this policy was mirrored by the PRC some twenty
years later.  The 1960s also saw the expansion of the two tier economy—large firms
dominated the domestic  economy and SMEs concentrated on exports.  (3)  A further
import substitution phase occurred in the 1970s as a result of the economic shocks of
the oil crisis and the diplomatic isolation caused by the de-recognition of the KMT as
the government of China. High inflation and world recession forced consolidation but
by  the  end  of  the  decade  the  large  firms  and  state  businesses  had  recovered  and
consolidated into various conglomerates, the SME sector had also weathered the storm
in good shape. (4) The last phase identified by the authors was the liberalisation and
globalisation of the economy in the 1980s. A free-market philosophy began to pervade
policy-making in the 1980s. In 1984 the KMT government took an important economic
policy decision to liberalise the domestic economy and to reduce protectionist tariffs.
Capital flows were liberalised and foreign banks allowed to establish from 1989. The
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results were impressive with Taiwan becoming the world’s third largest supplier of
computer  hardware  by  1995.  The  Party-state  had  been  instrumental  in  guiding
Taiwan’s economic development but liberalisation of the economy went hand-in-hand
with  political  change.  As  part  of  the  economic  liberalisation plan a  comprehensive
competition  statute  was  proposed.  This  radical  change  in  policy  resulted  from  a
realisation that cartels and monopolies were undermining Taiwan’s competitive edge.
Previously,  a  Price  Supervision  Council  directly  attempted  to  regulate  supply  and
demand by co-ordinating suppliers’ production levels by administrative fiat 47.
Competition policy and law
55 Thus, it appears to be no coincidence that the decision to adopt a competition policy
and an effective competition law was part of the overall decision in the mid-1980s to
liberalise both the political and the economic environment of Taiwan. However, that
did not mean that adoption of the new fair trade law was easy to accomplish; on the
contrary,  there  was  a  hard  fought  political  battle  by  those  who  opposed  the
introduction of a competition law 48.  Initial instructions to prepare a draft law were
issued in 1980 but a bill was not introduced into the legislature for six years and the
statute was not in fact enacted until 1991. During the 1980s, as a result of substantial
changes  in  the  Taiwanese  economy  and  the  global  economic  and  political  climate,
domestic monopolies and cartels (many sponsored by the KMT as sources of economic
and political patronage) were seen to be less economically effective. These outdated
structures  could,  it  was  thought,  potentially  hold  back  the  next  stage  of  economic
development and liberalisation. The move towards liberalisation was also thought to be
essential to support Taiwan’s accession to GATT and the WTO49. A new Fair Trade Act
came into effect in 1992 containing comprehensive competition provisions, after a 12-
year  gestation.  The  Taiwan  Fair  Trade  Act  1992  contains  provisions  to  outlaw
restrictive agreements, abuse of market dominance and provisions on merger control;
it is also a comprehensive consumer protection statute. It has been amended on three
occasions in 1999 to substantially increase penalties, in 2000 to amend administrative
practices and 2002 to amend the merger notification system by raising thresholds and
to increase the transparency of  the procedure generally.  A  new authority,  the Fair
Trade Commission (FTC) 50, was established to administer the new law and, by common
consent,  it  has  made substantial  progress  in  promoting competition policies  to  the
general population and effectively enforcing the new law, despite initial scepticism that
it would be unable to operate 51. The FTC has taken part in regional and international
discussions concerning competition issues, and the information provided on the FTC
website gives credence to the notion that the authority is both vigilant and effective in
detecting  and  punishing  offending  behaviour.  These  involved  the  whole  range  of
competition-related  problems,  including  monopoly,  mergers,  cartels,  re-sale  price
maintenance and consumer protection cases. During the period 1992 to 2000 the FTC
received 22,974 cases.  There were 1,829 decisions that involved the imposition of  a
penalty,  of  which only 214 were competition cases involving monopolies,  concerted
practices  or  mergers.  Most  of  the  penalties  cases  involved consumer protection,  of
which almost half were related to untrue advertisements. As a result of limitations of
space,  no  analysis  of  the  Fair  Trade  Act  will  be  attempted,  save to  say  that  it  has
comprehensive competition provisions as well as some unique features.
56 A selection of cases decided by the FTC is available on its website. They display the
expected hallmarks of competent analysis and decision-taking. The penalties imposed
on defaulters are significant. For example, a cylinder gas distribution cartel attracted
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fines  varying  from  NT$1  million  to  NT$15  million  52,  trade  associations  suggesting
concerted  practices  53,  a  ready  mixed  cement  cartel  54,  abuse  of  dominant  position
(NT$5 million fine) 55. A semi- conductor manufacturing merger was allowed despite a
concentration in the local production market due to benefits to the overall economy 56.
As  regards  implementation  and  enforcement  of  penalties,  none  of  the  difficulties
identified in China now pose serious problems in Taiwan 57. As for administration, the
Commissioners of the FTC appear to be more than adequately qualified with experience
in the legal and economics fields.  There are nine full-time commissioners,  with the
chairman ranked at the apex of the government administrative hierarchy. They are all
direct  presidential  appointees  and  appear  to  have  adequate  status,  resources  and
independence. The staff of FTC consist of 218 civil servants, 25% of whom are qualified
lawyers, 18% are economists, the balance of 57% being administrators. Over 35% have
Master’s degree qualifications and a further 55% have at least a Bachelor's degree 58. In
addition to investigative and enforcement work, the FTC undertakes public promotion
and education concerning competition very seriously. It offers courses for judicial and
other officials as well as promotional activities to enhance a competition culture within
enterprises  and Taiwanese society 59.  The FTC also has  a  consulting centre to  offer
advice  and  assistance  on  competition  questions  to  the  public  and  business.  It  also
engages in international fora (APEC, OECD) and undertakes bi-lateral co-operation with
other  national  competition  authorities.  The  evidence  suggests  that  the  Taiwan
experience of competition regulation is broadly positive, notwithstanding continuing
problems of judicial quality and corruption in politics and judicial administration 60.
57 China,  Taiwan  and  Hong  Kong  have  all  reacted  in  markedly  different  ways  to  the
regulation of their respective economies. China’s socialist heritage and its embedded
problems  as  an  authoritarian  state  have  to  a  large  extent  shaped  its  current
competition policies. Moving towards markets from central planning is never easy, as
can be so clearly seen in the other former socialist states of the defunct Soviet empire.
The tentacles of authoritarian control of the economy, deep distrust of markets, lack of
an adequate philosophical and educational infrastructure, corruption and xenophobic
nationalism provide a toxic combination when policy choices on the regulation of the
market have to be made.
58 In China’s case, one must question the philosophical commitment of the CCP to full
marketisation, as economic liberalisation without a matching commitment to political
pluralism will probably mean that the full fruits of appropriately regulated capitalism
may not be obtainable. But if pluralism is accepted, then it could spell the demise of the
CCP as the government of China. This is the conundrum that Chinese leaders’ face.
59 For Hong Kong, the dogged insistence of the Tung administration that all is well with
the regulation of economic activity is profoundly myopic, not evidence-based and relies
on a facetious mixture of propaganda and self-delusion. Evidence of a general failure of
policy-making in many spheres is increasingly apparent, with the government lacking
a coherent vision of Hong Kong’s economic problems and a plausible and rational plan
of how they might be remedied. The adoption of a general competition law would not
be  a  panacea,  but  at  least  it  would  signal  that  the  government  was  serious  about
promoting a more open and responsive domestic economy that is able to address the
increasing regional and international economic challenges that Hong Kong faces now
and will continue to face in the future.
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60 The fundamental  reason that  neither  Hong Kong nor  mainland China  are  likely  to
adopt  comprehensive,  workable,  fair  and  efficacious  competition  law  is,  at  root,
because  of  their  respective  political  systems.  The  lack  of  properly  functioning
democratic systems of government in both jurisdictions means that, for very different
and idiosyncratic reasons, neither Hong Kong nor the mainland will be able to adopt
workable competition laws in the near future. 
61 In China’s case, the whole political-economy system, while having the ability to enact a
law (should the  Party  hierarchy decide  to  do so)  is  unable  to  ensure  that  fair  and
impartial enforcement of such a law will actually take place in practice. The lack of
independence  of  any  newly  created  enforcement  body,  due  to  China’s  political
structures, from overt political interference by vested interests supported by political
actors, widespread corruption and on the technical level, a lack of trained and qualified
civil servants, economists and lawyers, will doom enforcement efforts to failure. Worse,
as  competition  law  concepts  are  inherently  broad  and  subject  to  good  faith,
discretionary enforcement and competition law can be perverted to grant additional
economic control powers to government over the non-state sector, which currently it
does  not  possess.  This  phenomenon  would,  paradoxically,  potentially  extend  state
control and would likely inhibit the development of China’s nascent market economy.
An example of this danger has already occurred by the enactment of the discriminatory
and baffling new rules on foreign-related mergers brought into force in 2003. The root
cause of these anticipated problems in ensuring effective and impartial enforcement is
the political environment; without political reform, which requires a fully functioning
democracy  with  separation  of  powers,  an  effective  judiciary,  independent  lawyers,
respect for the rule of law, an active and free press, a civil society able to lobby for
consumer interests and fair-trade rules, effective economic regulatory reform is not
possible. Clearly, China is currently far from achieving these objectives, so an effective
adoption of competition law is unlikely.
62 As  regards  Hong  Kong,  clearly  most  of  the  elements  of  successful  adoption  of a
competition law are present. Hong Kong enjoys a common law system, low corruption
rates, efficient government administration, a high degree of personal freedom and a
free press.  The appropriate and effective enforcement of  the sectoral  legislation on
competition  in  the  telecoms  and  broadcasting  industries,  shows  that  a  general
competition law could be made to work. The problem in Hong Kong is the implacable
opposition of the Executive to the notion of enactment of a suitable law. This results
directly from the domination of political power by members of the business elite who
directly  benefit  from the current status quo that  allows industry and commerce to
adopt widespread monopoly and cartel practices, so benefiting business proprietors at
the expense of consumers and potential new entrants to the domestic sector. Again, the
root problem of adopting an effective competition law is political. The current debate
over  universal  suffrage  for  the  election  of  the  Chief  Executive  and  the  Legislative
Council are a more easily attainable objective than the outbreak of liberal democracy in
China.  Therefore,  if  Hong  Kong  manages  to  evolve  towards  democracy,  a
comprehensive  competition  law  will  surely  shortly  follow.  Without  such  political
evolution, competition law reform in Hong Kong will only occur only if outside agents—
major  trading  partners  (the  United  States  and  the  European  Union)  or  economic
organisations (OECD or WTO) exert pressure on the Hong Kong government to put its
house  in  order,  as  has  recently  been  seen  in  respect  of  money  laundering  and
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terrorism.  Short  of  these  two  scenarios,  Hong  Kong  will  not  reform  economic
regulation.
63 Taiwan is in many respects, a textbook example of a successful transition from a highly
regulated and restrictive economic model to one based on openness and a promotion of
competition to benefit both private and commercial consumers. But this does not imply
that problems do not remain. One might ask why this has occurred. In the author’s
opinion, the move towards a more open and competitive economy was inextricably
linked to the parallel move in Taiwan towards a pluralist political system. Adoption of
economic and political competition have gone hand-in-hand and the success of pro-
competition  polices is,  it  is  submitted,  dependent  on  that  political  change  towards
democracy.
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